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Abstract
Across the political spectrum of different historical periods, welfare deterrence has
shaped social security and immigration policy in both Australia and the United
Kingdom. Deterrence discourages access to state welfare through the production
and mobilization of negative affect to deter specific groups from claiming state
support, and by crafting public affect (of fear and disgust) about these target popu-
lations in order to garner consent for punitive policies. In this paper, we argue that
deterrence works as a human technology where the crafting of negative affect operates
as a technology of statecraft.Through critical juxtaposition andmultiple genealogies of
deterrence, this papermeshes time and space, and colony/colonizer andmetropole, to
showthehistorical andcontemporaryconnectivityof theaffectivenatureofdeterrence.
We identify fivemainoperations thatproduce the ‘feel’ofdeterrence: stigmatizationby
design, destitution by design, deterrent architecture, the control ofmovement, and the
centrality of labour; as well as tracing the political economy of deterrence.
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1. Introduction
From the Victorian workhouse to contemporary welfare reform, the provision
of ‘welfare’ has long coexisted alongside policies and practices that mobilize
negative affect to deter specific groups from claiming state support, and to
craft public affect (such as fear and disgust) about these target populations.
Across the political spectrum of different historical periods, welfare deterrence
shapes social security and immigration policy in both Australia and the United
Kingdom (the joint foci of this paper), deterring and discouraging access to
state welfare through the production and mobilization of negative affect
(whether by design or as a by-product/unintended impact), especially
amongst and about already denigrated groups, including First Nations
people,1 asylum seekers, and disabled people. In many countries across
Europe, the United States and Australia, social security, especially provision
of welfare, is reliant on a ‘vast web of disentitlement strategies’ (Wacquant,
2009, p. 91), of which conditionality, ‘surveillance, sanctions and deterrence’
are key (Fletcher & Wright, 2017, p. 323). This paper argues that the political
crafting of hostile conditions that produce negative affect (including fear,
dread, shame and disgust) is central to operations of welfare deterrence in Aus-
tralia and the United Kingdom. Who and what is being deterred is different
across these different policy spaces, yet, as we will show, the production of
negative affect seems to provide linkages across these diverse cases.
Alongside social security, deterrence is now the dominant policy paradigm
and part of ‘normal policymaking’ in global immigration policy across
Europe, the United States and Australia (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017,
pp. 28–29). Deterrent policies include: increased policing of admission
routes, detaining people in offshore and onshore detention, criminalizing
asylum seekers and reforming policy, usually restricting access to welfare and
healthcare, in the refuge country (Burnett & Chebe, 2019; Gammeltoft-
Hansen & Tan, 2017). The crafting of ‘hostile environments’ in the United
Kingdom, for example, is designed to make it ‘as inconvenient and unpleasant
as possible to live in Britain without documents’ (MacDonald, 2017), and is
closely tied to limiting provision of social security (welfare) for migrants, and
the introduction of charging regimes in healthcare (Burnett & Chebe, 2019).
Whilst dependency is a well-examined trope of genealogies of welfare, less
attention has been paid to the production of negative affect as a form of deter-
rence evident within technologies of statecraft, nor to the close connectivity
between welfare and its deterrence. While most often mentioned in relation
to military strategy and especially the nuclear strategies of the Cold War, the
history of deterrence is usually narrated as beginning during World War 2
and intensifying during the ColdWar (Freedman, 2004). Much of the literature
on contemporary welfare deterrence frames it as ‘new’ and part of a ‘punitive’
neoliberal or neo-paternal turn (Fletcher & Wright, 2017; Wacquant, 2009).
While it is important to be attentive to what is ‘new’ within contemporary
uses of deterrence, this paper suggests that a focus on the ‘new’ – and the
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conceptualization of a ‘turn’ – can obfuscate the longer colonial history of deter-
rence in relation to domestic and global welfare and immigration practices
(Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018).
Juxtaposing very different examples of the affective nature of welfare deter-
rence can illuminate connections across divergent practices and populations
spanning time and space. Both the United Kingdom and Australia have
engaged in governmental and media construction of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers
and welfare ‘skivers’, and First Nations peoples in Australia as pathological,
to craft stigmatization of certain groups as ‘undeserving’, and to garner
public consent for punitive policies (Fekete, 2001a; Jensen, 2014; Mirza,
2014; Soldatic & Pini, 2009), partly through a ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak, 2015).
A key assumption underlying welfare deterrence and central to welfare pro-
vision in England since at least the seventeenth century (developing later in the
welfare regimes of some of England’s colonies, including Australia) is a (racia-
lized) moral economy of deservingness (Shilliam, 2018). For the state, this is
interpreted as a problem in differentiating between the underserving and deser-
ving; in order to prevent the undeserving from accessing welfare. Welfare
deterrence is imagined to provide the solution to these problems by making
reliance on welfare equal to the bare minimum required for survival. Deter-
rence, and the affect of deterrence, features in both social security and national
security policy, putting into question the traditional separation of these two
fields, the often overlooked embeddedness of domestic histories in ‘global inter-
dependencies’ of empire (Goodfellow, 2019), and the integral role played by
European colonialism in the development of welfare states (Bhambra & Holm-
wood, 2018). This separation also overlooks the ways national security has been
informed by social security, including the detailed historical and contemporary
accounts of the othering of groups within national borders, for example, the
construction of particular groups as threats (especially poor, disabled, mad
and racialized people, including refugees and First Nations peoples) to justify
their management and governance (Howell, 2014), and how such othering
shaped the ‘global reach of social welfare policies’ (O’Connell, 2009).
The specific focus of this paper on Australia and the United Kingdom comes
about (a) because deterrent policies have featured heavily in liberal democracies
including these two countries; (b) because the two countries share mutually
constitutive colonial histories; and (c) because there is contemporary political
cooperation and deterrent policy-borrowing between the two countries. The
significance of the two countries lies also in that Australia, a British penal
colony, was used as a deterrent: the threat of being transported there was in
part used to deter crime in England (the metropole), while convict labour
was enlisted in the genocidal elimination of First Nations peoples (Boyce,
2011). Policy exchange between the two countries follows a longer history of
empire where Australia was imagined as ‘the Little Brittan of the Indo
Pacific’, and ‘all policy was designed to maintain the British character of
Australia’ (Peters, 2003, p. 4). Australia, both a colony and colonizer continued
attempts to eliminate First Nations people on the continent (Wolfe, 2006), as
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well as being the colonial power in the eastern side of New Guinea until 1975,
and Nauru until 1968 (Vogl, 2017). Today, policy sharing continues between
these nations, where governments have invited exchanges on approaches to
immigration detention as well as welfare conditionality. For example, on the
27 October 2015, the former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was
invited by the Conservative Party to give the coveted Thatcher lecture. In
his speech, he argued that, ‘The Australian experience proves that the only
way to dissuade people seeking to come from afar is not to let them in’ (Abbott,
2015, emphasis added). Lynton Crosby, Australian political strategist, has
also played a key role in crafting Conservative election campaigns in the
United Kingdom, including the management of ‘Project Fear’ – which expli-
citly mobilized public fear in Britain’s major referendum debates (the Scottish
independence referendum, in 2014, and the UK referendum on EU member-
ship, in 2016) (Ganesh, 2015). Further solidifying these cross-country linkages
is the United Kingdom’s adoption of the ‘Australian-style points-based system’
for immigration, which increases scrutiny of personal characteristics to rank
migrants as ‘skilled’ or not, and to select only ‘skilled’ migrants to enter the
country (Sumption, 2019). Thus, tracing genealogies between Australia and
the United Kingdom is a useful starting point for further research into deter-
rence across colonial/metropole and temporal/spatial possibilities.
This paper proceeds first by defining deterrence as a human technology but
one that specifically operates to change human conduct through affect.
Second, we outline our methods. Third, we set out a brief genealogy of
welfare deterrence to examine when and how deterrent logic has shaped contem-
porary and historical debates related to welfare across the United Kingdom and
Australia; the linkages and policy-borrowing between the two countries; and the
continuities and disjuncture between historical and contemporary welfare deter-
rence. Particular attention is paid to literature that draws historical parallels with
contemporary deterrence, where early forms of deterrence (and especially the
deterrentworkhouses of the 1834EnglishNewPoorLaw), are seen as a blueprint
for contemporary deterrent policy (Besley et al., 1993; Fekete, 2001b; Fox-Piven
& Cloward, 1993). Fourth, we identify five main operations that produce the
‘feel’ of deterrence: stigmatization by design, destitution by design, deterrent
architecture, the control of movement, and the centrality of labour. Fifth, we
outline the political economy of deterrence. Lastly, we discuss how ideas of
rationality function in relation to deterrence; and conclude by focusing on the
urgency of reimagining non-deterrent welfare environments.
2. Deterrence and affect: Definitions
Deterrence has been theorized within various social science disciplines, with a
particular focus in law, criminology, psychology, international relations (IR),
and with other applications in political realism, economics and game theory
(see Lupovici, 2016). Criminologists and legal theorists, drawing on ideas
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from utilitarianism, have positioned deterrence as essential to uphold the social
contract, utilizing punishment, spectacle and hostile conditions to prevent
offence and re-offence. Here ‘deterrence is usually defined as the preventive
effect which actual or threatened punishment of offenders has upon potential
offenders’ (Ball, 1955, p. 347). Psychological conceptions of deterrence frame
it as a coercive strategy ‘concerned with deliberate attempts to manipulate
the behaviour of others through conditional threats’ (Freedman, 2004, p. 6),
often linked in the literature to conceptualizations of attachment, learning,
identity and behaviour change. In international relations, and particularly in
what has come to be known as the ‘RAND’ approach,2 deterrence is described
as emerging from Cold War military strategy, where it was seen as ‘the only
legitimate way to think about nuclear strategy’, and came to be associated
with and to reinforce the projection of power through rationality and civiliza-
tion enacted by global superpowers (such as the United States) (Lupovici,
2016, p. 42). Here deterrence is defined as an act that ‘discourages an adversary
from pursuing an undesirable action. It works by challenging the adversary’s
calculation of costs, benefits, and risks’ (Krepinevich, 2019). In his discussion
of deterrence, emotion and identity in relation to the United States and Israel,
Lupovici (2016) describes deterrence as an idea that has ‘constitutive effects’
(p. 18), and that is a form of knowledge (p. 26). Thus, ‘how a state practices
deterrence would tell us as much or more about the state itself than it does
about the state’s opponents and the threats they pose’ (Morgan, 1985, p. 136).
What isn’t alwaysmade explicit is how affect is central to deterrence. The ety-
mological roots of deterrence lie in the Latin word for terror (Morgan, 1985),3
developed, according to the Online Etymology Dictionary, in the mid-sixteenth
century, from Latin deterrere, from de- ‘away from’, with terrere ‘to frighten, fill
with fear’, with a combined meaning to ‘stop or prevent from acting or proceed-
ing by any countervailing motive’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
deterrence as the act of ‘deterring or preventing by fear’; and ‘deter’ as a transi-
tive verb meaning ‘to discourage and turn aside or restrain by fear; to frighten
from anything; to restrain or keep back from acting or proceeding by any con-
sideration of danger or trouble’. Despite the affective nature of deterrence,
little research focuses on the relationship between, and the design of, affect
and deterrence as a technology of statecraft.
By referring to affect, we are interested not only in feelings interpreted as
individual emotions but to the political crafting of affect: reading ‘structures
of feeling’ and ‘feelings of structure’ as indicative of how ‘feelings might be
how structures get under our skin’ (Ahmed, 2010, p. 216; also see Williams,
1977). To inform this approach, we trace examples of the design of conditions
that produce and intensify particular negative affect, by providing the ‘bare
minimum for survival’ (Puar, 2017, p. 134); what Povinelli (2011, p. 143)
calls the ‘lethal conditions’ produced through economies of abandonment;
and what are described by Weheliye (2014, p. 72) as the ‘life support systems
that sustain terror’. A key focus of this paper lies in thinking about the direct
and indirect design of affect, drawing on literature into ‘destitution by design’
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(Goulden, 2018, p. 2), plantation architecture (McKittrick, 2013), the politics
of fear (Wodak, 2015), and the design of racism (Lambert, 2016); as well as his-
torical examples, such as the design of the ‘deterrent workhouse’ and the
concept of ‘less eligibility’ (see below). A combination of scholarship of affect
with that of hostile design informs our thinking about the main operations of
welfare deterrence technologies and the design of insecurity through restrictive
administration of social security (i.e. welfare). We see this as occurring through
both the production of particular affect in denigrated groups (shame, fear, inse-
curity), and the cultivation of public affect to garner consent for ‘hostile’ pol-
icies. While this paper focuses more on the former, it is worth noting that
political and media crafting of public feeling, largely through a ‘politics of
fear’ (Wodak, 2015), plays a key role in the affective nature of deterrence.
For example, the UK government’s use of ‘Project Fear’ to shape contempor-
ary anti-immigration discourse explicitly uses fear as a political tool: ‘Playing on
people’s fears is not just effective, it is also right. Fear is a respectable emotion
that is hard-wired into us as a design feature, not a glitch. We are meant to feel
it’ (Ganesh, 2015). Public feeling, often framed politically as ‘genuine feeling’,
including fear, is also politically mobilized to justify punitive policies, overlook-
ing how public fears, and anti-immigration discourse, are partly crafted by gov-
ernment and media (Goodfellow, 2019, pp. 130–131). So, deterrence also
operates biopolitically, using spectacle to incite fear, dread and disgust in
order to deter the broader and untargeted population from ‘do[ing] as they
ought’ (Foucault, 1991; Li, 2007, p. 5).
Human technologies are ‘assemblages of diverse forces, instruments, architec-
tural forms, and persons to achieve certain ends, be they education, punishment,
production, victory or adjustment… [and] that seek the calculated transform-
ation of human conduct’ (Rose, 1996, p. 121). Our paper suggests that policies
and practices of welfare deterrence might fruitfully be understood as human
technologies in that they ‘seek the calculated transformation of human
conduct’ (Rose, 1996, p. 121). Taking this furtherwe explore how the transform-
ation of conduct is achieved through generating particular negative affect
(usually but not limited to fear, dread and anxiety), thus extending the literature
to take seriously the affective dimensions of human technologies (Million, 2014).
3. Method
The idea for the focus of this paper came from a number of different empirical
projects carried out by the authors: Klein and Razi (2018) and Klein’s (2020)
research into the use of the Cashless Debit Card (subsistence-level support
for First Nations people in Australia, discussed in detail later) and settler colo-
nialism in Australia, and Mills’ research into UK welfare retrenchment, suicide
and disabled people’s activism (Mills, 2018) and hostile environment policies,
immigration detention and suicide (Mills, 2020). This research has highlighted
the historical continuities between contemporary welfare deterrence and its
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historical manifestations. For example, one First Nations research participant
who had experienced the Cashless Debit Card said that the card reminded
them of Australia’s ‘ration days’ (where European settlers distributed rations,
and not wages, for labour) (Klein & Razi, 2018, p. 90); while various anti-aus-
terity activist groups have made links between current day UK welfare and
immigration reform, and England’s nineteenth century New Poor Law (dis-
cussed later).
This paper asks a number of questions about deterrence, specifically what
forms deterrence takes; when and how deterrence has shaped state practices
related to welfare across diverse geographies and historical periods; and
whether historical uses of welfare deterrence relate to, or continue to shape,
contemporary practices? The formulation of these questions creates the con-
ditions for their answers. For example, asking when welfare came to be associ-
ated with deterrence or talking about a deterrent ‘turn’ in welfare policy,
implies that the two were once separate and overlooks their important histori-
cal connectivities. To attend to these connections, we draw on Coddington’s
(2018) work on the slow violence of cashless technologies used with both First
Nations people in Australia and failed asylum-seekers in the United Kingdom,
which mobilizes a method of critical juxtaposition of public policies across the
two contexts, to ‘hold alongside each other things that appear separate, in
order to understand the underlying logics that animate their use’ (p. 2).
This paper is a similar critical juxtaposition of the affective nature of historical
and contemporary welfare deterrence policies enacted across the United
Kingdom and Australia. In juxtaposing two different countries and different
time periods, our method is partly, and partially, genealogical – borrowing
from Fraser and Gordon’s (1994) genealogy of ‘dependency’ (a concept that
much welfare deterrence seeks to deter). Our genealogical approach does not
trace a lineage, look for ‘originary moments’, or document a progressivist devel-
opmentalist history (Stoler, 1995, p. 9) of welfare deterrence. This means we do
not present our analysis in chronological order. Instead, we are interested in how
connectivities between welfare and deterrence ‘wrap around contemporary pro-
blems; adhere in the logics of governance;… and hold tight to less tangible
emotional economies of humiliations, indignities, and resentments’ (Stoler,
2016, p. 16), as well as how intensification (i.e. of deterrence) can make some-
thing appear as new (Gorman, 2017). This work is shaped by McKittrick’s
(2013) thinking on how plantation logic, seemingly left behind in the past, is
‘part of the environment we presently inhabit’ (p. 2), providing a ‘persistent
but ugly blueprint of our present spatial organization’ (p. 10) and racial violence.
Therefore, this paper uses genealogy and juxtaposition to remain cognizant of
the ways that ‘the historical time that we thought was past turns out to structure
the contemporary field with a persistence that gives the lie to history as chron-
ology’ (Butler, 2004, p. 54), and also of how what we assume to be new may
also have structured what has past. To do this, we follow Puar (2017) in
paying attention to ‘intensifications of biopolitical modes of control that are con-
tinuous and resonant with historical modes, and, indeed, across contemporary
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geopolitical spaces’ (p. 153). Puar (2013) engages with ‘assemblages of sen-
sations, affects, and forces’ (p. 24) that ‘do not accrete in linear time or within
discrete histories, fields, or discourses’ (Puar, 2013, p. 25) and are not ‘bound
to developmentalist or historical telos’ but instead ‘converge, diverge, and
merge’ (Puar, 2007, p. xxii). We thus use assemblage to refer to the messy con-
nections and divergences across time and space, and colony/colonizer and
metropole, in the production and mobilization of negative affect as a form of
deterrence. Our writing style aims to disrupt a linear reading, to show there
are no unproblematic straightforward connections between time and space.
Rather than an extractive approach to archival material, we follow Stoler
(2002, 2016) in taking an ethnographic approach, attuned to the partial,
messy, productive and constitutive nature of archival work. This means that
even as we study deterrence, our work simultaneously constructs an archive
of welfare deterrence. A wide diversity of resources, including primary and sec-
ondary materials, have been analysed for this paper. Secondary data of first-
hand accounts of the impact of welfare deterrence have been used to get a
sense of how these policies ‘feel’. This secondary data takes the form of
reports published by non-governmental and third-sector organizations, and
activist groups, with emphasis on literature written by or with those who
have experienced deterrence first-hand, for example ex-detainees, First
Nations people and disabled welfare claimants. Primary sources include: the
Hansard (transcripts of parliamentary debates and documents in both the
United Kingdom and Australia); historical documents on pauper management
and workhouse design (see later details); and archival documents found in the
online Australian Archival collection (Trove), and UK National Archives.
We now turn to briefly and partially outline some of the contours of the
relationship between affect and historical deterrence, before identifying some
main strands of welfare deterrence, which we turn to discuss in Section 5.
4. Historical parallels and continuities
While some literature conceives of welfare deterrence as part of a punitive turn
in policymaking (Fletcher & Wright, 2017; Wacquant, 2009), other literature
draws more on historical parallels and continuities. For example, Fekete
(2001b), draws parallels between the contemporary UK deterrent asylum
system and England’s New Poor Law of 1834, pointing out that by stripping
people of basic social rights and dignity in a system that denies access to the
welfare state,
the state’s approach to asylum seekers’ ‘welfare’ is without parallel in modern
times. Indeed, the only parallel lies within the… Poor Law of 1834, which insti-
tutionalised the dreaded workhouse system, forcing paupers who passed the
‘workhouse test’ for indoor relief to submit to a regime so awful as to deter
them from seeking refuge in the workhouse in the first place. (p. 32)
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Similarly, in their landmark book Regulating the poor (largely focused on the
United States), Fox-Piven and Cloward (1993, p. 35) show how the ‘deterrent
doctrine of relief’ written into the New Poor Law ‘provided a formula for relief-
giving in the urban industrial labour market’ (that continues into contemporary
times) and is centred on the principle of ‘less eligibility’. O’Connell (2009)
points to the Royal Commission into the Poor Laws as foundational to ‘policies
and knowledge categories about deserving and non-deserving populations that
continue to thrive today’, and that is ‘foundational to the history of social
policy, political economy, and state formation’ (p. 171). Given this foundational
nature, we will briefly outline the New Poor Law to give context, while at the
same time considering the longer colonial history and continued coloniality of
welfare deterrence, as well as examples of deterrence in British parliamentary
acts that predate the New Poor Law, such as those related to vagrancy (see
Foote, 1956; Kimber, 2013; Vorspan, 1977).
4.1. The New Poor Law, the deterrent workhouse and the colony as deterrent
In 1832, a Royal Commission was established to examine the provision of poor
relief in England (which pre-1832 was delivered in mixed ways at local parish
level). The final report from his majesty’s commissioners (in 1834) laid out the
idea of ‘less eligibility’, that is ‘the first and most essential of all conditions, a prin-
ciple which we find universally admitted’ is that the recipient of relief’s situation
‘shall not be made really or apparently so eligible as the situation of the indepen-
dent labourer of the lowest class’ (Poor Law Commissioners Report, 1834, p. 228).
The 1832 Commission recommended that the able-bodied poor could be given
relief in the workhouse under conditions less eligible than the working poor.
Less eligibility (what Fox-Piven & Cloward, 1993, see as providing a formula
for contemporary welfare) meant crafting hostile conditions as a deterrent (see
Longmate, 2003). The Poor Law Commissioners Report (1834) states that ‘into
such a house none will enter voluntarily; work, confinement, and discipline will
deter the indolent and viscous’, providing ‘an unerring test of the necessity of
applicants’ relieving parish officers from the responsibility of deciding who is
truly needy (p. 271). Here we see evidence of the ‘workhouse test’, where destitu-
tion could only be proved by accepting entry into the workhouse (Poor Law Com-
missioners Report, 1834, p. 264), reducing the need for time consuming tests of
merit or means. The workhouse test was an ‘administrative device’, which played
an informational and a screening role – distinguishing between those the Poor
Law would support and those it would not, as well as symbolically signifying gov-
ernmental ‘toughness’ (Besley et al., 1993). Digby (1982) claims that, ‘the cruelty
of the workhouse did not reside in its material deprivation but in its psychological
harshness. Indeed, the Poor Law Commissioners themselves appreciated that it
was through psychological rather than material deterrence that the workhouse
test would operate’ (p. 17). This leads Besley et al. (1993: 17) to state that ‘the
workhouse test worked through primarily psychological means’. Here the idea
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of a deterrent workhouse worked in a future oriented direction – to change poor
people’s incentives by encouraging them to avoid the workhouse through avoiding
poverty (Besley et al., 1993, p. 11).
The English poor laws were never introduced in the Australian colonies. The
colonial government instead promoted private charities to establish and run
institutions, including workhouses, which were shaped by deterrence
(Kimber, 2013). These included the ‘workhouse test’ (relief only in exchange
for work), the notion of ‘less eligibility’ (any relief offered to poor destitute
people had to be worse than that obtainable through work of the lowest
paid), and separation between the deserving and undeserving poor, particularly
through the legislation related to vagrancy (Vorspan, 1977). Settlers in Austra-
lia also used deterrence in their attempts to eliminate First Nations people. For
example, through the settler quest to disintegrate First Nations people’s access
to land and livelihoods, First Nations people were deterred from living freely
on their lands through the fear of extreme violence and hostility (Veracini,
2010; Wolfe, 2006). Here deterrence intersected with attempts at elimination,
both through the brutal spectacle of colonial sovereign power evident in
killing, and the creation of hostile conditions outside the missions and stations
in order to coerce First Nations peoples into accepting indentured labouring
relations (Smith, 2000). Attempts of elimination in settler Australia were not
just through killing outright, but also through processes of assimilation
where First Nations people were compelled to take on settler behaviours and
norms (Wolfe, 2006). Vagrancy laws coalesced with the assimilation process
as a deterrent and were used to label and criminalize First Nations people
who did not exhibit settler behaviour (Kimber, 2013), operating in part
through the affective generation of both fear and shame (Shaw, 1992).
5. Operations of deterrence as an affective technology
The paper now turns to the main operations of affect in welfare deterrence:
stigmatization by design, destitution by design, deterrent architecture, the
control of movement and the centrality of labour. While the below operations
are divided into sections for ease of reading, their multiple intersections should
not be overlooked, for example, destitution and control of movement have
strong linkages to stigmatization and fear; deterrent architecture links to
control of movement; and moral economies that privilege paid labour run
throughout. It is the affective dimensions of these multiple intersections that
make up the assemblage of welfare deterrence.
5.1. Stigmatization by design
Stigmatization is central to the design of conditions that incite negative
affect. The systematic vilification of asylum seekers as ‘dangerous,
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fraudulent, manipulative, and most of all welfare-seeking’ (Mirza, 2014,
p. 226), and the mass stigmatization of welfare recipients as ‘scroungers’
and ‘work shy’, have been used to mobilize public emotional reactions of
disgust in relation to those deemed ‘undeserving’. Stigmatization is used
to craft a punitive anti-welfare common-sense (Jensen, 2014; Tyler, 2020)
that creates public consent for the retraction of the welfare state (Soldatic
& Pini, 2009). These public feelings are used to justify the creation of a
‘vast web of disentitlement strategies’ around welfare provision (Wacquant,
2009, p. 91), of which ‘surveillance, sanctions and deterrence’ are key
(Fletcher & Wright, 2017, p. 323).
Both the United Kingdom and Australia provide examples of government-
led campaigns of stigmatization of welfare claimants – reconfiguring entitle-
ment into individual fault and fraud. For example, in 2011, then UK Prime
Minister, David Cameron (2011) called to dismantle a welfare system ‘that
encourages … people thinking they can be as irresponsible as they like
because the state will always bail them out’. In Australia, welfare dependency
is seen as a scourge in a nation of hard workers, illustrated in 2014 by then
Treasurer Joe Hockey’s declaration that his government would end the ‘age
of entitlement’ (Kenny, 2014).
The affective and psychic experience of stigmatization, and the deterrent
policies it is used to garner public consent for, is often part of their design.
In Polyani’s (1944) The great transformation, he describes how ‘the workhouse
was invested with a stigma’, and ‘deliberately made into a place of horror’
(pp. 101–102) where ‘psychological torture was cooly advocated and smoothly
put into practice by mild philanthropists as a means of oiling the labour mill’
(p. 82). Echoing into today, foodbanks (providing basic goods to those left des-
titute by austerity and welfare reform) are also invested with a stigma, with
users reporting ‘a pervasive feeling of stress’ and ‘feelings of shame and embar-
rassment’ (Hudson-Sharp et al., 2018, p. 106).
Today, we see an onslaught of stigmatizing portrayals of welfare claimants,
especially disabled people and asylum seekers, in print and online media (Briant
et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2017). Negative press coverage has played a key part in
crafting stigmatization and in creating a climate of fear towards asylum seekers,
and fear among asylum seekers (Bloch, 2013), used to garner support for policy
that increases hardship (Mollard, 2001).
This stigmatization is achieved in part through mobilizing ideas of ‘asylum
shopping’, and of the ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and ‘illegal immigrant’ con-
structed as abusing liberal asylum and welfare laws (Fekete, 2001a). Like
welfare claimants, migrants are constructed as a ‘burden on the taxpayer’ and
compared against the hyper-productive ‘model migrant’ (Jones et al., 2017,
p. 125). Both framings assume rationality and individual free choice, where
choices can be dissuaded through threat and conditionality. Contemporary
media coverage has echoes of the popular English publication in 1833 of
Harriet Martineau’s (1833) Poor laws and paupers, which constructed paupers
as idlers and rogues, helping solidify the idea that only by abolishing outdoor
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relief, and making relief conditional on the workhouse, would people learn to
rule themselves (Longmate, 2003).
In Australia, the racialized targeting of both income management and the
remote work for the dole program were legitimized to the settler Australian
public through the hysteria caused by bogus claims of First Nations men
trading in child sex cells in remote Northern Australian communities. This
claim, unsubstantiated still today, was made by the Federal Government’s
Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Mal Brough, through the state broadcaster
ABC’s 7.30 program, and led to the suspension of the Racial Discrimination
Act (Watson, 2009). The UK provision of welfare to asylum seekers through
vouchers and payment cards is, according to Fekete (2001b, p. 35), a central
part in the State’s ‘systematic humiliation and stigmatization of asylum
seekers’. Much evidence points to the stigma experienced by those using
payment cards and vouchers (Mulvey, 2009; Refugee Action, 2006).
5.2. Destitution by design
Since the mid-1990s, pre-entry deterrent measures in the United Kingdom
have occurred alongside increasingly restrictionist welfare policy (Zetter &
Pearl, 2000). In 2007, the Home Office stated that ‘those not prioritised for
removal […] should be denied the benefits and privileges of life in the
United Kingdom and experience an increasingly uncomfortable environment
so that they elect to leave’ (Home Office, 2007, p. 17). In 2013, then UK
Prime Minister, Theresa May introduced hostile policies that aimed to
prevent people from coming to the United Kingdom ‘because they’re able to
access everything they need’ (Travis, 2013, n.p.). The Immigration and
Asylum Act 1999 states that those ‘subject to immigration control’ should
have no recourse to public funds, prohibiting access to local authority
housing assistance, most welfare benefits, and other forms of support such as
free school meals. In 2012, these restrictions were extended to long-standing
migrant families (who had previously achieved rights to residence) – making
visible the intersections of welfare and migration regimes, and showing that
enforced destitution is a core technology of the United Kingdom’s migration
regime (Dickson & Rosen, forthcoming).
Longstanding critiques of ‘enforced destitution’ among asylum seekers as an
outcome of planned public policy (Cholewinski, 1998), continue to apply today.
For example, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007, p. 110) concluded
that the UK government is ‘practising a deliberate policy of destitution’, which
pushes asylum seekers into extreme poverty aiming to ‘disincentivize’ certain
groups to remain in the United Kingdom (Cholewinski, 1998) and to deter
future arrivals (Allsopp et al., 2014; Bloch, 2013) – what Goulden (2018)
calls ‘destitution by design’.
This design of destitution is also evident in historical deterrent policies. Eng-
land’s New Poor Law (1834), and the deterrent workhouses that it created,
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practised the concept of ‘less eligibility’ – ‘making relief more meagre and more
onerous’ than labour (Himmelfarb, 1983), and thought by Fox-Piven and
Cloward (1993) to provide a template for current-day welfare regimes. The
long history of stigmatization through the concept of undeservingness and
the construction of certain people as ‘workshy’, also has echoes in discussions
for the Prevention of Destitution Bill of 1910, where penal colonies were
suggested as a remedy for thriftless and workshy individuals. Ample archival
material documents the attention paid to making workhouse conditions
hostile (uncomfortable sleeping arrangements, repetitive labour, restricted
diet, separation between family members) (Himmelfarb, 1983; Longmate,
2003). For example, Captain George Nichols, sometimes known as ‘the
father of the Victorian workhouse’, and a Commissioner for the New Poor
Law, wrote a History of the English Poor Laws, stating that ‘the pauper is yet
subjected to so many disagreeable circumstances that the desire to escape
from these constantly urges him onto renewed exertion’ (Nichols, 2017
[1854], p. xiv). The workhouse logic of ‘less eligibility’ also appears to
inform the 1998 UK Government White Paper on immigration – ‘Fairer,
Faster, Firmer’ (UK Government, 1998)4 – which took ‘a tougher approach
to deterring and preventing the arrival of inadmissible passengers’ (Section
5.16), ‘aimed at deterring multiple asylum applications and, hence, widespread
benefit fraud’ (Section 11.14). through providing ‘for asylum seekers separately
from the main benefits system’ (8.17). Similar policy is evident in Australia
with the temporary protection visas given to people with refugee status. The
rights afforded to people on these visas are severely limited including tempor-
ary settlement rights meaning people don’t have future certainty and have to
reapply every three years. The temporary protection visas purposefully
inflict future insecurity on refugees through the requirement to constantly
reapply for protection, and in limiting rights to access, creating a cycle of
poverty and disadvantage, as well as psychological trauma and distress
(ASRC, 2019).
The design of destitution is also linked to settler colonial attempts of elim-
ination through ‘lethal conditions’ (Povinelli, 2011, p. 143) and assimilation
of First Nations people – what Altman (2018) refers to as cultural genocide.
One example is the Cashless Debit Card (CDC) – a trial that began early
2016 in Australia as a type of income management, formally aiming to deter
what the government sees as drug and alcohol use, anti-social behaviour and
unemployment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). The Card compulsorily
quarantines 80 per cent of state benefits received by all working age people
to restrict alcohol and gambling product purchases. Doing so severely limits
the amount of cash that can be withdrawn to 20 per cent of the total money reci-
pients receive, causing hardship for many and generating feelings of shame, dis-
tress and embarrassment (Klein & Razi, 2018). Whilst the card is new, the trial
reminds those subjected to it of the ‘ration days’ (Klein & Razi, 2018, p. 90),
where quantity of rations given on stations was calculated by how much
people needed to survive (Smith, 2000).
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Coddington (2018, p. 2) draws on secondary data that emphasizes how cash-
less technology (providing subsistence-level support for First Nations people in
Australia and refused asylum seekers in the United Kingdom) ‘feels’ for those
subjected to it. A British Red Cross report on the ‘humanitarian costs of a cash-
less system’ (focusing on the Azure payment card for asylum seekers in the
United Kingdom), shows that card users feel ‘embarrassed, anxious, and
trapped’; and like a ‘beggar’ and ‘desperate’ (Carnet et al., 2014, p. 9). In
fact, much research evidences the affective nature of everyday experiences of
destitution and poverty for asylum seekers and refugees, for example, impact-
ing on confidence and enhancing fear, shame, dependence and isolation (Bloch,
2013; Refugee Action, 2006). Similar feelings are reported by those who have
experienced the destitution caused by United Kingdom welfare reform. Mul-
tiple United Kingdom media reports of suicides and deaths thought to be
linked to welfare reform hint at the psychic life of welfare deterrence, and par-
ticularly how the construction of people who require state support as economi-
cally ‘burdensome’ creates internalized feelings of being a burden (Mills, 2018).
The means test, a feature of the Australian social security system since federa-
tion, also constructs certain groups as a burden, and connects to the deterrent
logic evident in the British workhouse test. The means test functioned as a
deterrent because claiming support was constructed as shameful – ‘Almost
all other advanced countries walked away from that method as demeaning to
personal dignity’ (Mendelsohn, 1996, p. 267). What draws the diverse examples
above together then is that they produce an assemblage of ‘sensations, affects,
and forces’ (Puar, 2013, p. 24) of deterrence that converge and merge across
time and space, wrapping past around the present, and colony/colonizer
around metropole (Butler, 2004; Stoler, 2016).
5.3. Deterrent architecture
Much scholarship and historical material charts the architecture and design of
hostile spaces: what Lambert (2012) calls the weaponization of architecture;
from plantation architecture (McKittrick, 2013), to Victorian workhouses, to
current immigration detention centres (see Lambert, 2016). Jeremy
Bentham, famous for his design of architectural surveillance in the form of
the panopticon, proposed building industry houses for ‘pauper management’
(Bentham, 1812). While Bentham’s design never became a reality, workhouses
were in fact designed to enact a deterrent function through cultivating particu-
lar negative affect, where ‘the forbidding look’ of the new workhouses was
intended as a ‘terror to the able-bodied population’ set to ‘inspire a salutary
dread’ (Driver, 1993, p. 59); and designed to be ‘looked to with dread’ (Long-
mate, 2003, p. 47; Newman, 2014).
In contemporary times, Pugliese (2008) argues that ‘the architecture of Aus-
tralia’s immigration prisons, functions as a type of tutelary architecture that
dispenses object lessons on deterrence whilst simultaneously generating the
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production of refugee trauma-as-spectacle’ (p. 206). This tutelary architecture
of deterrence is significant for our analysis of welfare deterrence as a human
technology, as it seeks to transform conduct through affect. This also hints
at what Hanafi (2012), in the context of colonial occupation in Palestine, calls
‘spacio-cidal’ (rather than, or as well as genocidal) regimes, which target
space through the deployment of colonization, separation, and the state of
exception (Hanafi, 2012, p. 190). Settler colonial regimes in Australia used
the vast distances between settlements, and the pain of separating First
Nations people from their country, to use exile as a deterrent for non-conform-
ing First Nations people. For example, First Nations prisoners captured for
non-compliance in the Kimberley between the 1890s and 1930s, could be
held in prison in Perth, some 3,000 kms away. Settler colonialism transformed
the land itself, through the erection of townships, pastoral leases, mining and
damming, meaning that whole landscapes filled with significance to First
Nations cultures were dramatically changed and erased, and showing that
settler colonial society was here to stay. These forms of hostile design are pro-
ductive of affect, producing what Ernst (2015), in relation to the jailhouses of
the early modern period, calls ‘spatially structured emotions’, or the spatial
structures of feelings, and the feelings of spaces.
5.4. Controlling movement
Controlling the movement of (usually poor and often racialized) people deemed
to be a threat is also central to the practices of deterrence documented in this
paper. The use of cashless payment cards in both the United Kingdom and
Australia manifest a carceral logic that enacts a ‘gradual erosion of mobility
and control’ over daily movements, signifying how welfare deterrence technol-
ogies can be immobilizing (Coddington, 2018, p. 11). In the United Kingdom,
the Azure payment card has been described, by those subjected to it, as like an
open prison, with one card user saying, ‘I’m inside walls; I’m not going any-
where’ (Carnet et al., 2014, p. 42). Furthermore, provision of these cards is con-
ditional on acceptance of dispersed accommodation (across the United
Kingdom). Similarly, rationing of First Nations Australians in the 1800s and
1900s was designed to restrict movement by forcing people to come to the mis-
sions to work. Alexander Forrest was the first settler to transverse the Kimber-
ley and saw the potential for large tracks of the Australian North to be turned
into profitable pastoral leases. For this expansion, First Nations people needed
to be moved out of the way (Wolfe, 2006). Whilst people were effectively either
hunted or starved off the land, fear also circulated, and it was the fear of settler
violence that led some First Nations people to accept the relative security of
going to the station and missions (Shaw, 1992). In 2014, the great nephew of
Alexander Forrest, mining billionaire Andrew Forrest, made a similar rec-
ommendation suggesting that First Nations people should be deterred from
staying in remote communities, proposing punitive welfare measures such as
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the Cashless Debit Card (Forrest, 2014), which in part operates through the
generation of shame (Klein & Razi, 2018).
In England, since the fourteenth century, beggars deemed ‘impotent’ were
sent back to claim relief from their place of birth. This was solidified into
law in the 1662 Act of Settlement and Removal, meaning a person applying
for residence in a new area had to prove they wouldn’t become chargeable to
the poor rates otherwise they could be removed (Longmate, 2003). Writing
at the time of the laws of settlement, Henry Fielding proposed the creation
of an internal passport system, where any ‘suspicious persons’ (left undefined)
could be apprehended to present their ‘pass’ (Fielding, 1988 [1754], pp. 240–
241). Thus, the passport was imagined as a tool for ‘controlling and curtailing
the geographical mobility of the lower classes’, representing ‘one of the earliest,
comprehensive designs of a British passport regime’ (Gulddal, 2015, p. 153).
(While this passport remained a proposal, the use of ‘passes’ for paupers did
exist in some English counties, see Longmate, 2003). Transportation of
paupers and criminals to the penal colony of Australia, through the Transpor-
tation Act of 1717 (4 Geo I c. 11) (Brooks, 2016), was a way to deter criminality
and vagrancy through instilling terror of servitude (Shaw, 1966). This Act was
closely linked to ideas about vagrancy and was created to ‘deter prospective
vagrants’ and ‘prevent professional vagabonds from exploiting public assistance
to the deserving’ (Vorspan, 1977, p. 75). The affective dimensions of vagrancy
laws lay in both promoting shame in those subjected to the laws as argued by
May (2000) in their study of vagrants in England, as well as the generation
of disgust in the broader population which assisted police targeting of vagrants
in the United States (Goluboff, 2016).
Detention and incarceration are central to deterrence and used by both the
United Kingdom and Australia as key planks in their contemporary immigra-
tion policies. Multiple reports document the negative affective and mental
health impact of detention, with those who have experienced detention
talking about feeling terrified, suicidal and depressed (Detention Action,
2014; Girma et al., 2014). Offshore and onshore detention is notoriously tor-
turous, not only because of the mandatory and indefinite nature of it, but also
because these facilities do not always provide basic services, such as healthcare.
The Australian government has been regularly criticized by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for its treatment of refugees
and asylum seekers detained indefinitely in the offshore detention camps of
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Behrouz Boochani a
Kurdish refugee detained in Manus Island has written about how the systema-
tic dehumanization in the offshore detention regime (Boochani, 2018a, p. 62) is
symbolic of Australia’s ongoing coloniality (Tofighian, 2018, p. 534). In his
analysis of Australia’s Manus Prison, Boochani (2018a, 2018b) notes the
many forms of psychological torture inherent in the design – how ‘over time
the rules and regulations wear down the prisoners’ mental health’ – from
the despair of indefinite waiting, to disgust at living conditions, to the
shame of incarceration.
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5.5. Centrality of labour
Framings of entitlement and deservingness shaped by the degradation of ‘the
recipient self’ and glorification of the ‘working self’ (Wacquant, 2009, p. 101),
have long been central within a ‘hierarchy of deservingness’ which itself is
‘central to considerations of affect’ (Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 83). Central to
welfare deterrence is the idealization of paid labour, often through crafting con-
ditions to ensure that paid labour is always the most attractive and incentivized
option compared to alternative forms of, and especially state, support. Ideas
about productivity, ability and willingness to work have long been a feature in
deterrence technologies. Foote (1956) in reviewing eighteenth century debates
around vagrancy in the United Kingdom remarks on the prominence of pro-
ductivity stating that: ‘Those who refused to work although able to do so were
viewed with hostile eyes, not only because of the suspicion they aroused but as
a potential relief burden’ (Foote, 1956, pp. 615–616). Here market ‘value’ is
used to negatively evaluate forms of life that require/are positioned as requiring
state support and to construct them as ‘burdensome’ (Mills, 2018). Mirza (2014,
p. 226) shows how the intersections of ableism with racial capitalism and coloni-
alism are foundational to the nation state and its deployment of ‘disabling pro-
cesses’, including the ‘systematic vilification’ of asylum seekers as ‘dangerous,
fraudulent, manipulative, and most of all welfare-seeking’ (Mirza, 2014,
p. 226). Controlling immigration, then, has long been linked to and justified
through protecting welfare provision/the welfare state, while immigration pol-
icies in many countries discriminate against disabled people based on their cat-
egorisation as an economic ‘burden’ (Mirza, 2014).
6. The political economy of deterrence
A key element running throughout the above historical and contemporary oper-
ations of deterrence is the political economy of deterrence. In the United
Kingdom, private companies, such as Mitie, hold contracts to run immigration
detention centres; the UK voucher system for asylum seekers was contracted to
French multinational, Sodexho Pass International; and the payment cards
given to asylum seekers are run by Aspen Payment Ltd. The United
Kingdom has a long history of income collection through immigration
control, from the 1905 Aliens Act (where the Home Office charged shipping
companies for the cost of removal of migrants) to current day charging
regimes (charges for healthcare, confiscation of wages, etc) that ‘sit at the
centre of immigration policy and practice’ (Burnett & Chebe, 2019, p. 1).
The United Kingdom Work Capability Assessment – which determines
whether welfare claimants are entitled to Employment Support Allowance
(ESA) – has been, since 2015, contracted to US outsourcing firm Maximus,
who are paid by the Department for Work and Pensions. Before England’s
New Poor Laws, utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham proposed the
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privatization of ‘pauper management’ to be subsidized by the government on
the model of the East India company, and the development of a chain of ‘indus-
try houses’ to make a profit out of enforced work for paupers (Himmelfarb,
1983). Although Bentham’s plan never came to fruition, one of his ‘disciples’,
Edwin Chadwick, drafted the New Poor Law, which came into being in the
year of Bentham’s death. That the East India company should feature in Ben-
tham’s imagination as a model for the ‘management’ of paupers, and that there
should be movement of personnel from the company to be commissioners for
the Poor Laws – is interesting given that the East India Company, despite
coming to prominence in the 1600s, has many similarities to what is now
known as neoliberalism (Tharoor, 2017). This raises questions about the poten-
tial limits of the ‘neo’ of neoliberalism and the tendency of some more unidi-
mensional contemporary analyses to locate many societal ‘problems’ as
beginning with neoliberalism.
In Australia – the private company Indue has been contracted by both the
Department of Social Services and Department of Human Services to
operate the Cashless Debit Card (CDC) and develop the technology (acquiring
over $10.8 million5 of the $18.9 million spent on the trial, up until April 2017).
Other corporations have also engaged in the CDC process including the Com-
monwealth Bank that helped the Minderoo Foundation to refine technologies
of the CDC, all profiting from cashless interventions. The CDC thus enacts
accumulation by dispossession, on a continuum with the dispossession of
First Nations people from their land and denial of sovereignty, through puni-
tive welfare, aiming to make people’s subjectivities conducive to settler norms
(and capitalist expansion) (Klein & Razi, 2018).
According to Polyani (1944), the ‘great transformation’ that signified Eng-
land’s rise to a market economy, involved the displacement of ‘moral
economy’ by political economy (Digby, 1982, p. 10). Yet, it seems significant
here not only to chart the use of deterrence both during and before England’s
‘great transformation’, but also to explore how the centrality of ideas of deserv-
ingness in contemporary welfare deterrence imply that certain aspects of earlier
moral economies of relief may persist in political economy (rather than signifying
a break), and in the ‘economies of abandonment’ identified by Povinelli (2011).
7. Discussion and conclusion
Focusing on deterrence in Australia and the United Kingdom, we have docu-
mented some of its main operations: how stigmatization and destitution are
fundamental to the design of deterrence, deterrent architecture and the infra-
structure of affect, control of movement, and the ongoing centrality of labour.
Through critical juxtaposition and genealogy, we have aimed to show how his-
torical examples of deterrence fold into, and wrap around, the present (Butler,
2004; McKittrick, 2013; Stoler, 2016), providing a blueprint for contemporary
welfare policy (Besley et al., 1993; Fekete, 2001b; Fox-Piven & Cloward, 1993).
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This approach enables us to question the sometimes assumed ‘new-ness’ of
welfare deterrence – tracing the generation of negative affect as a relational con-
nectivity between welfare and deterrence that is obscured if we conceive of con-
temporary deterrence as manifesting a punitive ‘turn’. Assemblage here refers
to the messy connections and divergences across time and space (Puar, 2013),
and colony/colonizer and metropole, in the production and mobilization of
negative affect as a form of deterrence.
While its manifestations in different times and places are context specific and
not necessarily comparable, our paper has shown that deterrence is inherently
affective, and as it shapes welfare policies and practices, is closely tied to the
crafting of affect through the production of conditions of hostility and destitu-
tion. This occurs not only through the cultivation of public affect to garner
consent for ‘hostile’ policies but also through the production of negative
affect in denigrated and stigmatized groups (shame, fear, insecurity). The psy-
chosocial and mental health impact of practices of deterrence, and how this is
used as evidence in activism against punitive immigration policies and welfare
reform, are also highlighted (Mills, 2020). Significantly, this paper shows that
the affective nature of welfare deterrence is not only a by-product of policies
but is also part of their design.
Another key theme running throughout the operations of deterrence detailed
in this paper is the mobilization of ‘will’ and rational choice – logics that have
roots in Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism (key to the development of welfare in
the United Kingdom). Deterrence, as practiced in military strategy and in
welfare, often presumes rational choice, even if between few or hostile alterna-
tives; assuming that one can perceive threat, calculate costs and benefits, and
act accordingly (Krepinevich, 2019; Lupovici, 2016). As deterrence seems to
operate largely through affect, this points to a potential relationship between
rationality, choice, and affect that is currently under-theorized. This suggests
that the subjects of deterrence have to be attributed rationality (narrowly con-
ceived of as an ability to choose between limited alternatives). Yet, the relation-
ship between coloniality and deterrence (where assumptions of colonized
peoples’ rationality have differed over time) puts this into question, and illumi-
nates differences in how deterrence functions alongside coloniality. The hier-
archization of subjects has long relied on attributions of rationality, where
certain groups (shifting over time), such as racialized and/or First Nations
and/or mad and/or disabled people, have been constructed as not, or not
very, rational, as a way to justify differing types of governance (often enacted
through oppression and violence) (Blanco & Grear, 2019). However, deterrence
also relates to the construction of threat through processes of othering which
often did not consider these subjects rational (Joenniemi, 1989). Deterrence,
thus, illuminates a tension between personhood, rationality and differing
forms of disciplinary and biopolitical statecraft – showing how these modes
of power may operate not separately but alongside each other. For example,
attempts at elimination of First Nations people in Australia included both
the sovereign power of outright slaughter and biopolitical assimilation. Power
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relations are central to deterrence, including the combination of sovereign, dis-
ciplinary and biopower, where the spectacle of force may operate alongside the
more banal administration of the bare minimum conditions for survival.
Bringing together very different mobilizations of welfare deterrence through
affect is important for tracing linkages across time and space, yet we must not
lose sight of the differential dispersal and experience of affect among different
groups. For example, research shows different affective experiences of the UK
asylum system and destitution according to gender (Querton, 2012) and age
(Pinter, 2012). Looking at welfare deterrence as it operates across immigration
and welfare systems enables attention to be paid to transnational intersections
of ableism with racial capitalism and colonialism (Mirza, 2014, p. 226). Yet,
questions also remain about the potential uniqueness of the Australian and
United Kingdom experiences of deterrence. Are similar operations evident
elsewhere? What are the differences of deterrence within different contexts:
settler colonial, old empire, and post-colonial? From what other aspects of
welfare, beyond social security and immigration, can we learn about deterrence?
Examinations of deterrence in other parts of the British empire would also be of
interest – especially those counted as postcolonial today such as India, as well as
continued settler colonial contexts, such as Canada, Palestine, the United States
and South Africa. Questions are also raised here about the limits of deterrence,
and the assumptions that underlie when it is employed as a strategy and when it
is not; and when it is conceived of as successful and when it is seen to fail.
Researching the long history of the relationship between welfare and deterrence
at a time of austere welfare reform and privatization of healthcare raises ethical
questions. Yet, if deterrence operates through generating negative affect in relation
to the crafting of hostile environments, then this illustrates the importance of craft-
ing other kinds of non-hostile and non-lethal affective environments. This is both
speculative but also currently underway in many contexts (for example, see the
work of the European Alternatives to Detention Network; continued activism
around prison abolition; activism and campaigning to abolish national borders
and border control - such as No Borders; and sustained activism by disabled
people’s organizations in the United Kingdom and Australia).6 This paper, and
the ongoing research in which it is embedded, speaks to the ethical urgency of
reimagining welfare outside of the negative affect of deterrence.
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Notes
1 We have used the term First Nations here rather than ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander’ or ‘Indigenous’ as the term ‘First Nations’ recognizes First Nations people as
sovereign people (see https://www.commonground.org.au/learn/aboriginal-or-
indigenous). As Rosalie Kunoth-Monks, Anmatyerr elder explains ‘I am not an Abori-
ginal, or indeed Indigenous, I am … [a] First Nation’s person. A sovereign person from
this country’.
2 RAND (Research and Development) is an American non-profit global policy think
tank.
3 Contemporary Spanish and French languages don’t translate deterrence in the same
form as English and Italian. Spanish and French use the word disuasión and dissuasion
respectively. Dissuasion is softer than deterrence, the meaning emphasis persuading
to change conviction, negated with the (dis). Both deterrence and dissuasion come
from the same Latin family, yet the meaning of deterrence for the French and




5 Contract number CN3323493 awarded to Indue operational contract,
$7,939,809.00. Contract number (CN3290604) awarded to Indue for the information
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